Does the deal clear the hurdle?
Short answer: no, not at base yields. The operator and the owner only ever agree inside an agreement band, and at base yields almost no band exists.
Where operator and owner can both say yes
An agreement band is the range of operator share of NOI where both sides are at least as well off as their fallback. At base yields, the band is empty almost everywhere.
At base yields: almost no band
Per unit, EGP nominal, 10-year term.
| Market | Option | Band | Share range |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cairo | O1 | No band | — |
| O2 | No band | — | |
| O3 | No band | — | |
| North Coast | O1 | No band | — |
| O2 | No band | — | |
| O3 | No band | — | |
| Red Sea | O1 | Band | 2–10% |
| O2 | No band | — | |
| O3 | No band | — |
At DeepSeek yield estimates: bands everywhere
Per unit, EGP nominal, 10-year term.
| Market | Option | Band | Share range |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cairo | O1 | Band | 3–28% |
| O2 | Band | 26–48% | |
| O3 | Band | 72–87% | |
| North Coast | O1 | Band | 5–30% |
| O2 | Band | 23–45% | |
| O3 | Band | 54–85% | |
| Red Sea | O1 | Band | 5–29% |
| O2 | Band | 21–43% | |
| O3 | Band | 50–89% |
At base yields only the Red Sea O1 has a band, and it is thin (2–10%). At the DeepSeek yield estimate every cell opens a band — but notice O3 needs the operator to take ~45–87% of NOI to make it work. That is far above the assumed s_op of 30%, which is why O3 fails at base yields.
Where does O3 break even?
The break-even revenue multiple asks: how many times base gross revenue must the unit earn before each option clears the hurdle?
Per unit, EGP nominal, 10-year term.
| Market | O1 | O2 | O3 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cairo | ×0.20 | ×1.36 | ×2.49 |
| North Coast | ×0.20 | ×1.22 | ×2.13 |
| Red Sea | ×0.20 | ×1.16 | ×2.05 |
O1 breaks even at a fraction of base revenue because the owner pays the fit-out in cash — the operator has almost nothing to recover. O3 must recover the entire fit-out plus deferral markup from operating income alone, so it needs roughly 2.0–2.5× base gross revenue. At the assumed base yields, that multiple is not reached.
The break-even multiple is the factor by which gross revenue must scale — holding the cost side fixed — so that the operator’s NPV reaches zero at the hurdle. It is a static point estimate, not a probability: it tells you how far base assumptions are from clearing the hurdle, not how likely that is. For likelihood, see the Monte Carlo section below.
How likely is each outcome?
2,000 draws over the uncertain inputs. The headline: even in the best case, O3 has a 0% chance of clearing the hurdle.
Per unit, EGP nominal, 10-year term. 2,000 draws.
| Market | Option | pPos | p5 | Median | p95 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cairo | O1 | 88% | -0.03M | 0.09M | 0.19M |
| O2 | 0% | -0.36M | -0.22M | -0.08M | |
| O3 | 0% | -0.74M | -0.54M | -0.35M | |
| North Coast | O1 | 89% | -0.03M | 0.10M | 0.24M |
| O2 | 2% | -0.40M | -0.22M | -0.05M | |
| O3 | 0% | -0.81M | -0.56M | -0.34M | |
| Red Sea | O1 | 92% | -0.01M | 0.06M | 0.14M |
| O2 | 2% | -0.20M | -0.11M | -0.02M | |
| O3 | 0% | -0.42M | -0.29M | -0.17M |
Across all three markets, the O3 operator NPV is negative at the 95th percentile — the best case in the distribution is still a loss. O1 is the mirror image, positive 88–92% of the time. O2 sits in between: positive 0% of the time in Cairo, and only 2% on the North Coast (Sahel) and Red Sea.
Method: 2,000 draws · revenue lognormal (sd 25%, mean −5%) · overrun triangular (0–35%) · inflation ±2pt · VAT 50/50 · pass-through 0.6–1.0 · ramp 0.5–0.9 · mid fit-out · s_op 30%.
Each draw re-samples the uncertain inputs within their stated ranges and recomputes operator NPV. pPos is the share of draws with positive NPV — a rough measure of how often the operator wins. The 5th, median and 95th percentiles show the spread. The key fact is not the exact percentile but the sign: for O3 the whole distribution sits below zero, so no plausible combination of the sampled uncertainties makes it work. That is the strongest statement in the model.
Cheaper capital also works
Cutting the operator’s hurdle by 10 points makes O2 positive in all markets at p=50%. O3 needs a ~20-point cut.
| Option | Hurdle cut | Cairo | North Coast | Red Sea |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| O3 | 0pt | -0.37M | -0.38M | -0.19M |
| -5pt | -0.31M | -0.31M | -0.15M | |
| -10pt | -0.23M | -0.22M | -0.10M | |
| -15pt | -0.13M | -0.10M | -0.04M | |
| -20pt | 0.01M | 0.05M | 0.05M | |
| O2 | 0pt | -0.08M | -0.07M | -0.03M |
| -5pt | -0.04M | -0.02M | 0.00M | |
| -10pt | 0.01M | 0.04M | 0.04M | |
| -15pt | 0.08M | 0.12M | 0.08M | |
| -20pt | 0.17M | 0.22M | 0.15M | |
| O1 | 0pt | 0.20M | 0.23M | 0.14M |
| -5pt | 0.22M | 0.26M | 0.15M | |
| -10pt | 0.25M | 0.30M | 0.18M | |
| -15pt | 0.29M | 0.35M | 0.21M | |
| -20pt | 0.35M | 0.43M | 0.25M |
At a 10-point cheaper hurdle, O2 clears in every market at p=50%. O3 needs a ~20-point cut to turn positive — a deeper discount than O2 needs, because O3 must recover the entire fit-out from income alone. A fund, developer line, or family-office mandate at 10+ points below T-bill+8 is worth more than re-pricing the deal structure.
Minimum draw and owner-paid shortfall do not fix the problem
A guaranteed annual recoup looks protective, but the deferred balance already clears within 10 years in every case — so the shortfall rule never triggers. The problem is time value, not default.
Across every rule, every market and every tier tested, the unrecouped balance at year 10 is 0.00M. The operator is always repaid in full — just slowly, at no interest. A minimum draw lifts operator NPV slightly (O3 premium, draw 40%/yr: Cairo −0.63M → −0.37M) but the operator is still negative, and it wipes out the owner’s surplus (Cairo +0.72M → −0.62M).
Base yield, mid
| Option | Rule | Cairo | North Coast | Red Sea |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| O3 | none | -0.37 / 0.64 | -0.38 / 0.82 | -0.19 / 0.67 |
| owner pays shortfall | -0.37 / 0.64 | -0.38 / 0.82 | -0.19 / 0.67 | |
| draw 8%/yr | -0.37 / 0.63 | -0.38 / 0.82 | -0.19 / 0.67 | |
| draw 8% + owner | -0.37 / 0.63 | -0.38 / 0.82 | -0.19 / 0.67 | |
| draw 12% + owner | -0.37 / 0.59 | -0.38 / 0.82 | -0.19 / 0.67 | |
| draw 16% + owner | -0.36 / 0.56 | -0.38 / 0.82 | -0.19 / 0.67 | |
| O2 (p=50%) | none | -0.08 / -0.42 | -0.07 / -0.29 | -0.03 / 0.07 |
| owner pays shortfall | -0.08 / -0.42 | -0.07 / -0.29 | -0.03 / 0.07 | |
| draw 8%/yr | -0.08 / -0.42 | -0.07 / -0.29 | -0.03 / 0.07 | |
| draw 8% + owner | -0.08 / -0.42 | -0.07 / -0.29 | -0.03 / 0.07 | |
| draw 12% + owner | -0.08 / -0.42 | -0.07 / -0.29 | -0.03 / 0.07 | |
| draw 16% + owner | -0.08 / -0.42 | -0.07 / -0.29 | -0.03 / 0.07 |
Premium tier and low yield (×0.75)
| Tier · yield | Rule | Cairo | North Coast | Red Sea |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| premium · base | none (forgive) | -0.63 / 0.72 | -0.63 / 1.04 | -0.33 / 0.79 |
| owner pays | -0.63 / 0.72 | -0.63 / 1.04 | -0.33 / 0.79 | |
| draw 30% + owner | -0.45 / -0.16 | -0.49 / 0.33 | -0.26 / 0.46 | |
| draw 40% + owner | -0.37 / -0.62 | -0.40 / -0.16 | -0.21 / 0.19 | |
| mid · ×0.75 | none (forgive) | -0.49 / -0.09 | -0.51 / -0.21 | -0.26 / 0.08 |
| owner pays | -0.49 / -0.09 | -0.51 / -0.21 | -0.26 / 0.08 | |
| draw 30% + owner | -0.31 / -0.88 | -0.35 / -0.96 | -0.19 / -0.27 | |
| draw 40% + owner | -0.27 / -1.17 | -0.30 / -1.29 | -0.16 / -0.45 | |
| premium · ×0.75 | none (forgive) | -0.78 / -0.13 | -0.82 / -0.13 | -0.42 / 0.13 |
| owner pays | -0.78 / -0.13 | -0.82 / -0.13 | -0.42 / 0.13 | |
| draw 30% + owner | -0.46 / -1.55 | -0.52 / -1.49 | -0.28 / -0.54 | |
| draw 40% + owner | -0.40 / -1.94 | -0.44 / -1.95 | -0.24 / -0.80 |
The unrecouped balance at year 10 is 0.00M in every row — the deferred balance always clears within 10 years, so the owner-pays-shortfall rule never triggers. Only the draw rows move the numbers, by shifting value from the owner to the operator; the operator stays negative.
Scale-up does not rescue the economics by itself
At O2 p=60% the unit-level NPV sum is ~0 to +2.7M at base yield — far short of the central cost. The 6M EGP/yr central team is a est placeholder, not a real budget.
| Yield | Units | Peak capital | Unit NPV sum | Central cost PV | Net NPV | Break-even units |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ×1.0 | 50 | 14.0M | 0.0M | 20.0M | -20.0M | 22,696 |
| 200 | 56.0M | 2.7M | 20.0M | -17.3M | 1,493 | |
| ×1.2 | 50 | 14.0M | 2.3M | 20.0M | -17.7M | 426 |
| 200 | 56.0M | 12.3M | 20.0M | -7.7M | 325 | |
| ×1.5 | 50 | 14.0M | 5.7M | 20.0M | -14.4M | 177 |
| 200 | 56.0M | 26.3M | 20.0M | 6.2M | 153 |
The central team figure is an unverified placeholder est, not a real budget, and the unit-overhead scale economies (6% → 5% at 50 units, 4% at 200 units) are assumptions, not measurements. The business only covers its central cost at 150–180 units and yield ×1.5 (net +6.2M at 200 units); at base yield it never does. Do not present this as a plan until the central cost and overhead are replaced with real numbers.