100% cash upfront
The owner pays the full cost plus markup in cash. The operator’s share of NOI starts from first operation.
Lowest risk to the operator, highest cash cost to the owner.
One operator, one fit-out, three structures. They differ in when the owner pays and when the revenue share starts — and that timing decides who carries the risk.
The same finished unit, funded three ways. What changes is the markup, the deferral markup, and who waits for the recoup.
The owner pays the full cost plus markup in cash. The operator’s share of NOI starts from first operation.
Lowest risk to the operator, highest cash cost to the owner.
The owner pays part of the cost plus markup in cash; the unpaid balance is recouped from operating income, with a higher deferral markup on the deferred part.
A middle path: some cash now, the rest from income.
The owner pays nothing upfront. The operator recoups the full fit-out from operating income; the share starts once recouped.
Most attractive to the owner, heaviest for the operator.
Per unit, EGP nominal, 10-year term.
| Option | Owner pays upfront | Markup on the part paid upfront | Deferral markup on the deferred part | Share starts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| O1 | 100% of cost + markup | 15% | — | From first operation |
| O2 | 50% of cost + markup | 15% | 25% | Once recouped |
| O3 | 0% | — | 25% | Once recouped |
The operator’s NPV and the owner’s surplus pull in opposite directions. O1 is good for the operator; O3 is good for the owner; neither side can have both.
Per unit, EGP nominal, 10-year term.
| Market | Option | Operator NPV | Owner surplus |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cairo | O1 | 0.20M | -1.48M |
| O2 | -0.08M | -0.42M | |
| O3 | -0.37M | 0.64M | |
| North Coast | O1 | 0.23M | -1.44M |
| O2 | -0.07M | -0.29M | |
| O3 | -0.38M | 0.82M | |
| Red Sea | O1 | 0.14M | -0.55M |
| O2 | -0.03M | 0.07M | |
| O3 | -0.19M | 0.67M |
Negative operator NPV means the operator would need to be paid more than the NOI can return at the hurdle to break even. Positive owner surplus means the owner ends up richer than the next-best alternative (selling). Under O3 the owner is clearly better off and the operator is clearly worse off — that gap is the honest core of the whole model.
These are the s_op, markup and hurdle assumptions behind every result. Where a number is an unverified calibration it carries the badge.
| Parameter | Value | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Markup on cash (m) | 15% | Assumed |
| Deferral markup (m′) | 25% | Assumed |
| Cash share (p) | 50% | Assumed |
| Operator share (s_op) | 30% | Assumed |
| Recoup fraction (r) | 100% of NOI to recoup first | Assumed |
| Term | 10 years | Fixed |
| Hurdle | T-bill path + 8pt est | Unverified calibration |
| VAT | 0% or 14% | Scenario pair |
The hurdle follows the T-bill path (recently around 25%) plus 8 points — an unverified calibration that moves the whole answer. See Assumptions & risks for the full calibration list.
Every structure pays a 15% markup on the cash the owner puts in upfront, and a 25% deferral markup on whatever is deferred to operating income. In O2 the owner pays 50% in cash, so half the cost carries the 15% and half the 25%. In O3 the owner pays nothing, so the whole cost carries the 25% deferral markup. The operator then takes s_op = 30% of NOI after recoup, for the rest of the 10-year term.